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Deference of Jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board and the Arbitration Clause
I.

THE PROBLEM

In 1935, when the Wagner Act was passed, arbitration was not used
extensively as a method of settling labor disputes. Most parties to labor
disputes relied on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or the
courts as means of settlement, rather than binding themselves to the
decision of an arbitrator.' Gradually, however, with the increased availability of more skilled arbitrators and the acute awareness of the costs
of outside solution, arbitration has become a highly popular method of
settling labor disputes. It is estimated that 94 percent of all collective
bargaining agreements now provide for arbitration of grievances not
settled by the parties themselves. 2 Much of this popularity has been due
to its recognition as a successful alternative to litigation, 3 and to its
judicial sanction by the Supreme Court as "a major factor in achieving
industrial peace."' Recently, in Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerks,5 the

Supreme Court reiterated its approval of the arbitration process by
suggesting that arbitration has become "the central institution in the
administration of collective bargaining contracts." 6
Despite the popular acceptance of the arbitration process as a settlement device, disputing parties may still be confronted with the problem of which forum-arbitration, the NLRB, or the courts-should

resolve a particular labor dispute arising out of a collective bargaining
agreement containing an arbitration clause. This forum problem occurs
when the labor dispute involves conduct allegedly constituting a breach
of that collective bargaining agreement as well as an unfair labor practice. 7 Arbitration can resolve -the dispute pursuant to the provisions of
1. See Address by NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller, Conference of Western States Employer Association Executives, Aug. 27, 1971, reported infull in 78 LABOR REL. REP. 28, 31 (1971).
2. 2 BNA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 51:6 (1970); U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-1, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 1 (1964).

3. Generally, arbitration is said to be faster and less expensive. See McCulloch, Arbitration
and/or the NLRB, 18 ARB. J. (n.s. 3.4 (1963).
4. United Steelworkers v. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). This
case is one of three Supreme Court cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, which stand as a
statement of the Court that final adjustment by methods agreed to by the parties is the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes regarding the application or interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.
5. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
6. Id. at 252.
7. A clear example of this might be the collective bargaining contract explicitly forbidding
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the contract, but sections 8 and 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Acts empower

the NLRB to prevent unfair labor practices, and section 301(a) of the
same Act9 authorizes district courts of the United States to assert jurisdiction over suits involving a breach of the collective bargaining contract."0
Initially, the Supreme Court's decision in Garner v. Teamsters
Union" had been the basis for precluding an arbitrator or a court from
adjudicating a breach of the collective bargaining agreement in which
the conduct constituting the breach was also an unfair labor practice;
the Board had exclusive jurisdiction over such a matter.' 2 Following
Garner, the Court held, in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon,'3 that the jurisdiction of state and federal courts is preempted
by that of the Board with respect to conduct that is arguably protected
by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the Act. Consequently, this
holding was used to support the argument that if the conduct allegedly
constituting a breach of the collective bargaining agreement was also
arguably subject to sections 7 or 8 of the Act, the Board had exclusive
jurisdiction to review such conduct. 4 Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court refuted this argument and permitted the lower federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over conduct arguably subject to sections
7 or 8 of the Act "where Congress has affirmatively indicated that such
power should exist ... -"'5 This affirmative indication has been found
unfair labor practices. For example, many agreements prohibit an employer from discriminating
against an employee for engaging in union activities. An employer so discriminating would not
only be breaching the collective bargaining agreement but also would be violating § 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
8. "The Board is empowered as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging
in any unfair practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting commerce. This power shall not
be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established
by agreement, law, or otherwise ....
".National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
9. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties." Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1970).
10. Employees, although excluded in the language of § 301(a), have been included as a result
of Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
I1. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
12. Dunau, ContractualProhibitionof Unfair Labor Practices:JurisdictionalProblems, 57
COLUM. L. REv. 52-53 (1957).
13. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
14. See McCulloch, supra note 3.
15. Amalgamated Ass'n of Streetcar Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297 (1971);
Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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in section 301 so that federal court jurisdiction over breaches of collective bargaining contracts is not destroyed merely because the breach
also is arguably an unfair labor practice. 6 In other words, in regard to
this preemption question, section 301 suits are exempt from the Garmon
rule. 17 Therefore, the Board and the courts retain concurrent jurisdiction" over conduct that allegedly constitutes both an unfair labor practice and a breach of the collective bargaining agreement.' 9
The parties' solution to this problem of concurrent jurisdiction
often depends on the remedy sought, for the available remedies in each
form are substantially dissimilar. In a section 301 action, the court
could remedy a breach of contract with either damages, 2 specific performance, 2' or injunctive relief in certain instances. 21 On the other hand,
the NLRB is given broad discretion to form an appropriate remedy that
is adapted to the particular situation23 and that will "effectuate the
16. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
17. Amalgamated Ass'n of Streetcar Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 298 (1971);
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
101 n.9 (1962). The Garnon principle will still have some impact on the case due to the fact that
federal common law will be applied on the basis of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
18. Thus in addition to any available remedy under the Act, there might also be a contractual
remedy in federal court pursuant to section 301. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195,
197 (1962); notes 20-28 infra and accompanying text.
19. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187-88 (1967); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416
F.2d 711, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc., 373 F.2d 762 (5th
Cir. 1967); United Steelworkers v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir.
1964).
20. E.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
21. E.g.. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). This
remedy would include the requiring of arbitration if provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement.
22. Section 301 effectuates an exception to the anti-injunction provisions of § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). Section 4 prevents any court of the United States
from enjoining any person or persons participating in a labor dispute from engaging in certain
activities, one of which is a refusal to perform work. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195 (1962), the Supreme Court barred the federal courts from enjoining strikes in violation
of no-strike provisions of collective bargaining agreements, reasoning that § 301 was not intended
to limit the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia. Sinclair, however, has recently been
overruled by Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), which held that a federal
court may, pursuant to § 301, enjoin a strike conducted in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. In determining whether injunctive relief may be granted, the Boys Markets majority
adopted as a rule the guiding principles suggested by the dissenting opinion in Sinclair: "A District
Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunctive relief against concerted activity
unless and until it decides that the case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite
the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 398 U.S. at 254.
23. See NLRB v. District 50, UMW, 355 U.S. 453 (1958); Lipman Motors, Inc. v. NLRB,
451 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1971).
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policies of [the National Labor Relations Act]."
clude orders to bargain,

5

4

Such remedies in-

orders to cease and desist,2 6 orders to rein-

state with or without back pay 27 and temporary injunctive relief pursuant to sections 10) and 10(1) of the Act. Monetary relief as a sole
remedy has not been granted as frequently by the Board as it has by
2
the courts. 1

In those instances in which a Board remedy would be desirable and
an unfair labor practice charge is filed with the Board, the Board is then
confronted with the problem of what effect it should give to the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement. 29 As previously
stated, section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act empowers the

Board to prevent any unfair labor practice, with this power not being
affected by any private agreement among the parties."0 Despite this
grant of exclusive jurisdiction, however, section 14(c)(1) of the Act"'

states that the Board, in its discretion, may decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving any group of employers in one of two
ways: (1) by rule of decision, or (2) by published rules adopted pursuant

to the Administrative Procedure Act. 32 Although not as explicitly
stated as in section 14(c)(1), the language of section 10(a) itself clearly
suggests a congressional intention to allow discretionary deference by
34
the Board,3 3 and this has been continually recognized by the courts.
24. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). See Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 195-96 (1967).
25. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Garment
Workers' Local 57 v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 942 (1967), enforcing
and rev'g in part sub nom. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965).
26. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945).
27. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
28. "The award of monetary relief for an employer's failure to bargain is an unusual remedy
... Herald Co. v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 430, 436which has been used very sparingly by the Board.
37 (2d Cir. 1971).
29. The courts also are faced with this problem in actions to compel arbitration or to enforce
an arbitration award.
30. See note 7 supra. See also NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360 (1969); NLRB v. Acme
Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967).
31. National Labor Relations Act § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970).
32. "The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute
involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such
labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction
.1Id.

33. Whereas § 10(k) states that the Board is "empowered and directed" to hear
a § 8(b)(4)(D) charge (subject to exceptions), § 10(a) merely states that the Board is "empowered" to prevent unfair labor practices. Not directing the Board to prevent all unfair labor practices
is tantamount to giving it discretion over when to exercise its jurisdiction. See Dunau, supra note
12, at 61.
34. E.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964); Smith v. Evening
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Therefore, the question presented is: under what circumstances will the
Board either hear a labor dispute involving an unfair labor practice or
defer to arbitration? This note will analyze the discretion of the Board
as promulgated by its rules of decision in order to identify the basic
rationale that the Board uses in deciding this deference question.
II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Much of the significance of the deferral problem exists because of
the differences between arbitration and NLRB proceedings. The basic
advantage of arbitration is that the dispute is usually settled by an
arbitrator whose skill, experience, and knowledge pertaining to the particular labor and trade customs involved has made him more capable
than any other forum to arrive at an appropriate and just remedy.
Moreover, use of private arbitration often serves to curtail undesired
public attention toward the dispute. The widespread use of arbitrators,
however, inevitably results in inconsistent decisions, which flies in the
face of one of the major reasons for the establishment of the
NLRB-uniformity of decisions. While the Board's primary approach
is one of administrative stare decisis, arbitrators usually confine themselves to the special situation before them and are disinterested in what
may have resulted in other disputes with similar factual situations.
Moreover, the arbitrator's rationale is often directed toward finding a
solution that will best fit within the intention of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement; the Board's rationale, however, must additionally include considerations of the rights of those not party to the
agreement. In other words, the analysis of a particular problem by an
arbitrator might be substantially different from that of the Board. Consequently, because the forum for settlement can be of great significance
to the disputing parties, the Board's discretion will have a substantial
impact on the eventual outcome of many disputes.
Two major conflicting labor policies influence the exercise of this
discretion. First, the Act itself states that the national labor policy is
that industrial peace can best be secured through the encouragement of
collective bargaining 5 by which the settlement of issues between employers, employees, and their representatives is best achieved by mutually agreed-upon methods, including that of voluntary arbitration. 6
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1934 (1971).
35. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
36. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 201(a)-(b), 29
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This policy favoring private settlement is most directly stated in section

203(d) of the Act: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance

disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement." 7 Secondly, although the solution of
a labor dispute by arbitration, as agreed to by the parties, may be the
desirable method for settlement, section 10(a) makes it explicit that the
Board's jurisdiction cannot be defeated by such a private agreement.38
Congress recognized that the Board, regardless of any agreement
among the parties, must be able to resolve any unfair labor practice

dispute in order to effectuate the other policies of the Act. The Board
is a quasi-judicial body existing, pursuant to section 10(a), to protect not
only the interests of the parties to the agreement, but also the interests
of those not necessarily reflected in the collective bargaining process-the public and the economically vulnerable. The arbitrator, on the
other hand, represents a system of self-government established by those

he serves, and under section 203(d), he functions to apply and interpret
the existing collective bargaining agreement. Unlike the Board, he is not
necessarily the protector of the interests of third parties.39 The policy

conflict confronting the Board in every deference question, therefore, is
essentially between the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction by sec-

tion 10(a) and the national labor policy-stated in sections 201(a),
201(b), and 203(d)-encouraging settlement by privately agreed-upon
methods.
III.

RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICTING POLICIES

A.

Nature of Dispute Involved

In Electrical Workers Local 259 v. Worthington Corp.,"° the First
Circuit stated that one of the considerations used by the Board in the
U.S.C. §§ 171(a)-(b) (1970).
37. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1970). For cases recognizing this as the national labor policy see Amalgamated Ass'n of Streetcar
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 309-13 (1971) (White, J., & Burger, C.J., dissenting);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 582 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-68 (1960); NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co.,
439 F.2d 674,678 (2d Cir. 1971); P.R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 948,952 (7th Cir. 1969);
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150,77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1935 (1971); Dubo Mfg. Corp.,
142 N.L.R.B. 431, 432 (1963), enforced, 353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965).
38. See note 9 supra.
39. See NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1971). See also McCulloch, supra note 3.
40. 236 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1956).
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exercise of its discretion is the type of unfair labor practice charged.',
Commentators have taken a similar position by suggesting that the
exercise of deference of jurisdiction is often determined by whether
the case involves a question of representation, discrimination, jurisdiction, or refusal to bargain.12 One example of such an approach,
expressed in Board Member Brown's concurring opinion in the recent
Collyer Insulated Wire decision,43 is that the deferral policy should be
applied in discrimination and refusal to bargain cases, but perhaps not
applied in representation cases. 4 Although such an approach may be
sound in theory and although the nature of the charge involved may
have some impact on the Board's deferral decision, an analysis of the
cases reveals that, with the exception of jurisdictional disputes and refusal to bargain disputes arising out of a refusal to furnish information,
an application of the nature-of-the-dispute approach will not only misconstrue the reasoning of the Board in many cases, but will lead to
incorrect conclusions and increased confusion regarding the Board's
deference rationale.
1. JurisdictionCases.-The language of section 10(k) of the Act
excepts jurisdictional suits from the general language of section 10(a),
which empowers the Board to prevent unfair labor practices. Pursuant
to section 10(k), the Board is "empowered and directed to hear and
determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have
arisen, unless . . . the parties to such dispute submit to the Board
satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods
for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute."45 Resolution of the deference question, therefore, depends on whether this statutory exception is
applicable. When the parties have agreed to be bound by arbitration,
the Board will defer. 6 If, however, the parties have not agreed on meth41. Id. at 368. The court cited as its authority the analysis in Note, JurisdictionofArbitrators and State Courts Over Conduct Constituting Both a Contract Violation and an Unfair Labor
Practice,69 HARV. L. REv. 725, 731-36 (1956).
42. See Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration,77 YALE L.J. 1191 (1968); McCulloch, supra note 3.
43. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971). For a discussion of this recent decision
see text accompanying notes 113-29 infra.
44. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1939-40 (Brown, Member, concuring). In his address before the FMCSAAA Regional Conference on Labor Arbitration, NLRB General Counsel Peter G. Nash stated,
contrary to Member Brown's opinion, that deferral in a discrimination case might not seem

appropriate.

LAB. REL. YEAR.

151, 154 (1971).

45. National Labor Relations Act § 10(k), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970) (emphasis added).
46. E.g., NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 123-25, 136 (1971) (Board must defer
if parties submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have agreed on methods of voluntary
settlement); Electrical Workers Local 728, 153 N.L.R.B. 873 (1965).
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ods of voluntary settlement, the Board will exercise its jurisdiction and
resolve the dispute. 47 Consequently, due to the language of sectiorf 10(k),
the nature of the dispute does have a substantial effect on the Board's
rationale on deference when the case involves a jurisdictional dispute.

2. Representation Cases.-Although some confusion exists on

the distinction between a representation and a jurisdictional dispute,48

the basic difference is that the former questions which union shall represent certain employees, whereas the latter questions which union may
have its member employees do certain work. 9 Initially, it was held that

the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction to settle questions of representation.5" Much of the basis for this holding was that section 9(b) of the
Act grants to the Board the power to decide in each case what the
appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes shall be.5 In Raley's
Supermarkets, Inc.,5" however, the Board deferred to the decision of an
arbitrator despite the language in section 9(b), because arbitration had
been provided for in the contract between the parties, the arbitration
award had already been rendered, and the question at issue involved an
interpretation of the contract.

3

Subsequent to Raley's, the Supreme

Court approved Board deference in representation cases by holding, in
Carey v. Westinghouse,54 that such disputes are not within the sole
jurisdiction of the Board and that, as in Raley's they may be deferred

to arbitration.
Later decisions, however, have clearly indicated that the fact that
a dispute involves a question of representation does not necessarily
make deference appropriate. In Hotel Employers Association of San
47. See, e.g., Electrical Workers Local 1505 v. Machinists Local 1836, 304 F.2d 365, 367
(Ist Cir. 1962) ("jurisdictional disputes between unions are precisely its [the Board's province"citing NLRB v. Broadcast Engrs. Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573 (1961)); Newspaper Deliverers' Union,
141 N.L.R.B. 578 (1963).
48. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 264-70 (1964).
49. In other words, representation involves unions disputing over control of people, and
jurisdiction involves unions disputing over control of work.
50. "It has been universally held that the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
to determine the unit appropriate for collective bargaining purposes and settle questions of representation is exclusive." International Chem. Workers v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 202 F.
Supp. 363, 365 (S.D. I1l. 1962). See also Retail Clerks Local 1357 v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 202
F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
5I. "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof
... National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
.
52. 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963) (dispute over representation of janitors and bottle sorters).
53. Id. at 258-59.
54. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
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Francisco,55 the Board refused to defer because, unlike the dispute in
Raley's, the dispute over the representation of certain hotel clerks did

not involve an issue of contract interpretation the resolution of which
would also settle the representation question. 6 In Dayton Typographic
Service, Inc.,5 7 the Board refused to defer a dispute over union representation of an employee at a meeting, reasoning that the issue involved
day-to-day dealings with the employees and could have had a broad
impact on conditions in all the shops. In NLRB v. Horn & Hardart
Co.,"' the Second Circuit recently upheld the Board's refusal to defer

to an arbitration award regarding the representation of certain restaurant cashiers, when it found that the question had not been fairly presented to the arbitrator. These more recent cases demonstrate that considerations other than the nature of the charge are determinative of

whether the Board should defer in representation cases.
3.

Discrimination Cases.-Similarly,the mere fact that a dispute

involves discrimination, does not necessarily call for deference by the
Board. It has been argued, in some cases successfully,5 9 that submitting

such a dispute to arbitration would either run the risk that the statutory
policies will be ignored or misconstrued, or create a danger of bias
against an employee by an arbitrator whose authority often derives from
the contract between the union and employer.6 0 The NLRB also has

refused to defer when the specific issue of discrimination involved was
not within the competence of the arbitrator and was primarily one
requiring solution under the Act." On the other hand, the Board has
deferred to arbitration when the proceedings seemed fair to the grievants and consistent with the Act's policies,62 thereby suggesting that an
55. 159 N.L.R.B. 143, 148 (1966). See also Pullman Industries, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 580
(1966).
56. Acord, Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768, 771 (1967).
57. 176 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 72 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1969).
58. 439 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1971).
59. Carpenters Local 180, 162 N.L.R.B. 950 (1967) (arbitration body possessed interests
contrary to those of the grievant); Woodlawn Farm Dairy Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 48 (1966) (arbitration
proceedings would not have protected interests of those discriminated against).
60. Note, supra note 42.
61. Eastern Illinois Gas & Sec. Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 639 (1969), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 440 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1971) (discharge). See also McLean Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B.
440 (1969).
62. Howard Elec. Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 338 (1967); Schott's Bakery Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. 332
(1967); Modern Motor Express, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1964). The Board deferred to the
arbitrator's decision in these cases, since they satisfied standards established in Spielberg Mfg. Co.,
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), and International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced
sub non.. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964). See notes 78-84 infra. See also Hribar
Trucking Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 745 (1967), enforced as modified, 406 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1969), for a
case in which the arbitration did not satisfy such standards, and the Board did not defer.
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arbitrator is competent to resolve justly a dispute involving discrimination. In other discrimination cases, the Board has refused to defer when
arbitration had not yet occurred; 3 yet, in Dubo ManufacturingCorp., 4
it did defer on the question of an allegedly discriminatory discharge
despite the lack of an arbitration award. Consequently, much like cases
involving representation questions, the only pattern that can be identified in cases involving charges of discrimination is that the deferral
question depends more on the facts of the particular case than on the
nature of the charge.
4. Refusal-to-bargain cases.-(a) Refusal to furnish information.-Both the Board's decision in Hercules Motor Corp.65 and its
decision in Sinclair Refining Co.6 have been cited as authority for
the proposition that deference is appropriate in unfair labor practice
cases arising out of an employer's refusal to furnish relevant information." In those two cases, the unions sought data 8 to aid in the processing of certain grievances. The Board deferred to arbitration in each case
because the central issue-whether the union had the right to pursue a
grievance over the subject of the dispute-could only be determined
through an interpretation of the contracts. Subsequent cases, however,
have retreated from the positions of Hercules and Sinclair, and it now
appears that in cases involving a refusal to furnish information, the
Board will not defer to arbitration. In Acme Industrial Co.,69 the Supreme Court enforced a Board order requiring an employer to furnish
information regarding the removal of plant machinery since it was relevant to the union's discharge of its statutory duties. The Board has since
followed the Court's holding and refused to defer in such refusal to
furnish information cases on the grounds that the right to the information is statutory, unaffected by any grievance-arbitration procedure.70
This retreat from the earlier position of Hercules and Sinclair is most
recently evidenced by P.R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 1 in which the
63. Steves Sash & Door, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 154 (1969), enforced, 430 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1970); Hoerner-Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 772 (1967).
64. 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963), enforced, 353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965) (the Board refused to
defer the §§ 8(a)(5) and (a)(1) charges, but did defer the § 8(a)(3) charge).
65. 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962).
66. 145 N.L.R.B. 732 (1963).
67. E.g., Square D Co., 332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964).
68. In Hercules, the union sought time-study and job evaluation data, and in Sinclair, the
union sought data pertaining to vacation allowances.
69. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
70. Scandia Restaurants, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 326 (1968); Univis, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 37
(1968); Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950 (1964), enforced as modified, 359 F.2d 983 (1st
Cir. 1966).
71. 411 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1969).
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Seventh Circuit enforced a Board order directing an employer to furnish
information concerning an incentive wage system despite the fact that
some question of contract interpretation was inevitably involved. 2 The
court stated that "the Board's self-limitation in Hercules Motor Corp.
has been all but abandoned by the Board itself," and "the decision of
the Fifth Circuit in Sinclair Refining Co. v. NLRB was specifically

disapproved by Acme. '73 Consequently, in refusal-to-bargain cases,
when an employer is charged with refusing to furnish relevant information, the Board apparently will not defer to any available arbitration
procedure.
(b)

Unilateral action.-Although it has been argued that defer-

ence is appropriate when the case involves unilateral action constituting
a refusal to bargain unfair labor practice, 74 there is no evidence that the
Board has placed any particular significance on the nature of the charge
when deciding whether to defer to arbitration. To the contrary, cases
involving unilateral action present the clearest indication of how the
Board looks beyond the nature of the charge and considers the particular factors involved in the cases to resolve the deference problem in a
manner that will best effectuate the policies of the Act. With some
factors favoring deference and others suggesting exercise of jurisdiction,
the Board's rationale becomes an accommodation of the policy favoring
private settlement with the policy of the Board having exclusive jurisdiction. It is an accommodation achieved by a consideration of many
relevant factors, rather than a determination based on the nature of the
unfair labor practice charge involved. 75 This approach, evident in the
unilateral action cases, will now be examined as being, for the most part,
the more accurate description of Board deference rationale.
B.

Considerationof Case Factors

An analysis of the factors considered by the Board when deciding
whether deferral is appropriate must begin by separating the cases into
two distinct classes-those in which there already has been an arbitral
award, and those in which an award has not been made.

1. Arbitral Award Already Rendered.-The arbitral award re-

72. Id. at 954.
73. Id. at 956 (citations omitted).
74. See Speech by James G. Davis, Midwest Labor Law Conference, reported in 78 LAB.
REL. REP. 176 (1971); Note, supra note 42. All unfair labor practices caused by management's
unilateral action are not refusals to bargain, but the majority of such unilateral actions do fall into
that category.
75. As Member Brown stated in his concurring opinion in Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1421 (1964): "Each case stands on its own facts."
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ceived early acceptance when, in the case of Timken Roller Bearing
Co.,7" the Board deferred to an arbitrator's decision, despite the fact that
the Board could otherwise have found that an unfair labor practice had
been committed. The Board was unwilling to allow the union a second
hearing, after having lost its case initially at arbitration.7 7 In Spielberg
Manufacturing Co.,7" the Board's approach was refined substantially
and set forth in the well-recognized rule that the Board will defer to an
arbitration award if: (1) the arbitration proceedings appear to have been
fair and regular; (2) all parties had agreed to be bound by those proceedings; and (3) the arbitration decision is not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act.79 Later, the Board apparently modified
the Spielberg rule in InternationalHarvester Co.,8" and stated that it
would defer claims arising from the same facts as an arbitrated contract
dispute unless the arbitration proceedings were "tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural irregularities or . . .the award
was clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. 81 The
tests established by these two cases are essentially the same except that
the latter does not require that all parties must have agreed to be bound
by the arbitration proceedings. Apparently, under the Spielberg test, the
Board would not defer to an arbitration award if the employer has
refused to be bound by that arbitration proceeding; under the
InternationalHarvester test, however, the Board might still defer. Although the more recent rule of InternationalHarvester has been accepted by the Supreme Court,8" the Board apparently favors the use of
the Spielberg test, for it has consistently continued to cite Spielberg,
either as a concurrent test with that of InternationalHarvester,3 or as
the sole test that the Board will apply. 4 Due to this recognition in recent
76. 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946).
77. "It would not comport with the sound exercise of our administrative discretion to permit
the union to seek redress under the Act after having initiated arbitration proceedings which, at
the union's request, resulted in a determination upon the merits." Id.
78. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
79. Id. at 1082.
80. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub. nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.
1964).
81. Id. at 927.
82. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1964).
83. See, e.g., Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Diary Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1420 (1964) (Member
Brown's concurring opinion).
84. See, e.g., Office and Professional Employees Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314, 319
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1935-36,
1939, 1942 (1971); Eastern Illinois Gas & Sec. Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 639, 641 (1969), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 440 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1971) (dicta in Member Brown's dissenting
opinion).
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Board cases, the Spielberg test should not be considered as having been
discarded in favor of that of InternationalHarvester,and therefore, the
requirement that all parties must have agreed to be bound by the arbitration proceedings has remained essential for Board deference to those

proceedings.
2. No Arbitral Award Rendered.-"In those cases in which no
85
award [has been] issued, the Board's guidelines have been less clear.
Much of this confusion is due to the many factors considered by the

Board when deciding whether deferral is appropriate, and the varying
significance associated with each factor in the different cases. Some of
these factors, if present, make deferral seem appropriate, while others
require the Board not to defer. In addition, there are other Board considerations that have been supportive of deference in some cases but

have been refuted in other cases as not being influential on the Board's
exercise of discretion. As a result, the Board has yet to arrive at any

express guidelines on the deferral question, thereby leaving only an
analysis of the cases as means of arriving at some indication of the
Board's rationale.

A study of the cases reveals that the Board will not defer when any
one of a number of factors is present. The Board will not defer if the
dispute is a matter outside the competence of an arbitrator." The Board

also will exercise jurisdiction if neither party has sought arbitration or
is willing to arbitrate." Deference will be refused if the issue of the
dispute has already been fully litigated before the Board 8 or pertains
essentially to a statutory matter rather than contractual interpretation. 9
Lastly, the cases indicate that the Board will not defer if the arbitrating
85. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (1971). Problems of this situation have
been said by one Board member to be "much more difficult." Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1422 (1964) (Member Brown's concurring opinion).
86. See Eastern Illinois Gas & Sec. Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 639 (1969), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 440 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1971); McLean Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 440 (1969)
(competency of arbitrator not needed).
87. See Zenith Radio Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 366 (1969) (both parties felt that Board should
decide the issue); Morrison-Knudsen Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 56 (1968); W.P. Ibrie & Sons, 165
N.L.R.B. 167 (1967); C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams
Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
88. See Consolidated Freightways Corp., 181 N.L.R.B. 856 (1970); McLean Trucking Co.,
175 N.L.R.B. 440 (1969); Union*Drop Forge Div., 171 N.L.R.B. 600 (1968), enforced as modified,
412 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1969).
89. See Eastern Illinois Gas & Sec. Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 639 (1969), enforcement denied on
other grounds,440 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1971); Gravenslund Operating Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 513 (1967);
W.P. Ihrie & Sons, 165 N.L.R.B. 167 (1967); C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966);
Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1416 (1964).
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body would possess interests clearly contrary to those of the grievant."
Although the Board will not defer if any of the above situations
exists, the nonexistence of those factors does not automatically make
deference appropriate. For example, the Board will not necessarily defer
if the subject matter of the dispute is within the arbitrator's competence,
if the dispute has not been fully litigated before the Board, or if the
question of the dispute is essentially one of contract interpretation.
Actually, the cases do not indicate any one circumstance that, if present,
would definitely cause the Board to defer. All that can be concluded is
that there are certain factors which either (1) have an inconsistent effect
on the Board's decision or (2) tend to suggest that deferral is the better
course.
The positive or negative implication of some Board considerations
is not evident from the cases. One example of the confusion involves the
question whether the grievance-arbitration procedures must be exhausted before the Board should exercise jurisdiction. Initially, the failure to fully utilize these procedures often was used as a factor supporting
deference." Subsequent cases, however, suggest that such a failure is not
sufficient reason for the Board to defer.9 2 The impact of the employer's
willingness to arbitrate on Board rationale is also not precisely indicated. In some cases, the employer's willingness to arbitrate has been
given as one of the reasons for NLRB deference;93 but, in other cases,
the Board has refused to defer despite the willingness of the employer
to go to arbitration. 4 Although this suggests that the willingness of the
employer to arbitrate is not necessarily a factor favoring deference, the
Board apparently has adopted the position that the employer's unwillingness to arbitrate is a factor against deference. When the employer
has not been willing to go to arbitration, the Board has not deferred. 5
90. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 180, 162 N.L.R.B. 950 (1967).
91. See Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95
N.L.R.B. 753 (1951); Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706 (1943), enforced as
modified, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
92. See Iron Workers Local 229, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 74 L.R.R.M. 1317 (1970); Steves
Sash & Door, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 154 (1969), enforced, 430 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1970); MorrisonKnudsen Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 56 (1968); Cuneo Eastern Press, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 523 (1967);
Hoerner-Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 772 (1967); Hod Carriers Local 300, 159
N.L.R.B. 1128 (1966), enforced, 392 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1968).
93. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969); Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Sinclair
Ref. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 732 (1963); Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962).
94. See Union Drop Forge Div., 171 N.L.R.B. 600 (1968), enforced as modified, 412 F.2d
108 (7th Cir. 1969); Producers Grain Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 466 (1968).
95. See Office and Professional Employees Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir.
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The factors which favor deferral include a showing: (1) that the

alleged wrongful act was committed in good faith and without any antiunion motive;"8 (2) that the parties to the dispute have had a long-

established and successful bargaining relationship;97 and (3) that the
complaining party had sought arbitration initially but had changed its
course in midstream by filing a charge with the Board.98 Although these

factors are not sufficiently significant by themselves to convince the
Board that deferral is appropriate, their existence has been continually

used in support of Board deference.
If one element of a case could be said to have the most substantial

effect on the Board's decision of whether deferral is appropriate, it must
be the extent to which the dispute involves the interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agreement. As stated earlier, section
203(d) of the Act specifically provides that disputes arising over the
applicationor interpretationof collective bargaining agreements should
be settled by methods agreed upon by the parties,99 which would include
arbitration. Accordingly, the function of the arbitrator rarely exceeds

the application of interpretation of the contract provisions."' Thus, it
has been argued that the arbitrator, not the NLRB, should settle disputes at the centers of which are conflicts over the application or interpretation of the contract. The Board has adopted this reasoning in
certain cases as support for its decision to defer,10' especially in cases in
which the arbitrator's interpretation also will resolve the unfair labor
1969); Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950 (1964), enforced as modified, 359 F.2d 983 (1st
Cir. 1966). NLRB General Counsel Peter G. Nash has stated that "it seems correct to assume
tha respondent's [employer's] willingness to resort to arbitration at the time he urges Board
deferral is essential to the Collyer policy." Address by Peter G. Nash, FMCS-AAA Regional
Conferences on Labor Arbitration, Oct. 15, 1971, reported in LAB. REL. YEAR. 151, 155 (1971).
96. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969); Vickers, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 561 (1965); Bemis
Bros. Bag Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1963).
97. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969); Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1963).
But see Union Drop Forge Div., 171 N.L.R.B. 600 (1968), enforced as modified, 412 F.2d 108
(7th Cir. 1969).
98. See Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1963); Montgomery Ward & Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 418 (1962). But see Union Drop Forge Div., 171 N.L.R.B. 600 (1968), enforced as
modified, 412 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1969).
99. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Board Member Brown's concurring opinion in Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1420 (1964).
101. See Square D Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141
(1969); Vickers, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 561 (1965); Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962);
McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954).
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practice issue.' This preference for deferral, however, has not been
uniformly applied by the Board in all cases involving contract interpretation. Both the courts and the Board have frequently held that the
Board is not precluded from interpreting and applying contract provisions. 03 Those holdings recognize that in deciding whether an unfair
labor practice has or has not been committed, the Board must perform
an interpretive function. This is unavoidable, but it need not require the
Board to defer. If it did, the Board's case load might be so drastically
reduced that the Board's usefulness would be abolished. A separation
of the issues-the contract question to the arbitrator and the statutory
question to the Board-might be a reasonable solution to the deference
problem, if it were not for the monstrous procedural difficulties involved. What has resulted is that the arbitrator's function and the
Board's power to interpret and apply contractual provisions co-exist,
leaving the possibility of forum shopping to be resolved by a predictable
deference rationale that has not yet been established. 04
The presence of a contract interpretation or application issue in a
dispute has been a major factor in the two recent significant cases in
which the Board has deferred to arbitration. In Joseph Schlitz Brewing
"' the respondent employer decided to halt its production line durCo., 05
ing employee breaks, which resulted in, among other things, elimination
of the relief man job classification. The union filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board, but the Board deferred to the arbitration
procedures of the collective bargaining agreement. The Board ruled that
in unilateral action cases, it should defer to an arbitration clause agreed
to by the parties if three conditions are met: (1) the contract clearly
provides for grievance and arbitration machinery; (2) the alleged wrongful conduct is not designed to undermine the union, and is based on a
substantial claim of contractual privilege; and (3) it appears that the
arbitral interpretation will resolve both the contract issue and the unfair
labor practice issue in a manner compatible with the policies of the
102. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B.
1410 (1964). See also Wollett, The Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Who
Should Have Primary Jurisdiction?10 LAB. L.J. 477 (1959).
103. See NLRB v. Acme Indus., Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.,
385 U.S. 421 (1967); Cello-Foil Prod., Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 676 (1969); K & H Specialities Co.,
163 N.L.R.B. 644 (1967), enforced, 407 F.2d 820 (6th Cir. 1969); Long Lake Lumber Co., 160
N.L.R.B. 1475 (1966); C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966).
104. The possibility of forum shopping exists since the Board will usually not apply the same
rules of interpretation as will the arbitrator.
105. 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
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Act.' 08 The Board determined that these conditions were satisfied because the parties had a long, established, and successful bargaining
relationship, the dispute involved substantive contract interpretation,
each party was asserting its claim in good faith, the grievancearbitration procedure was clearly defined, and the employer was willing
to arbitrate.1 7 This rationale, which is in essence a compilation of the
positive deferral factors,0 8 was then combined by the Board"0 9 with the
position that deferral is appropriate if contract interpretation is at the
center of the dispute."0 Based on the subsequent decision of Progress
Bulletin Publishing Co.,"' it is clear that the Board deferred in Schlitz
essentially because of the presence of the interpretation issue. In
Progress Bulletin, the Board refused to defer to arbitration a dispute
over the unilateral termination of a Christmas bonus. Although several
positive deferral factors similar to those in Schlitz were present, the
Board determined that since the contract was silent on the bonus, no
issue of contract interpretation existed. The Board failed to adopt the
Schlitz rule, rejecting it as only applicable to disputes "patently a matter
2
of contract interpretation.""
The effect of the contract interpretation issue also was the determining factor in the Board's recent Collyer Insulated Wire case.1' 3 In
a 3-2 decision, the Board deferred to arbitration a dispute over an
employer's unilateral changes in wages and job duties. Citing Schlitz as
its primary support, the majority decided that deferral to arbitration
was appropriate because the dispute arose entirely from the contract
and therefore should be resolved in the manner that the contract prescribed. The majority added that these disputes are better resolved by
arbitrators, who possess better skills and have more experience in such
matters than has the Board, and that deferral in such cases will encour106. Id. at 142.
107. Id.
108. See notes 91 & 92 supra (pertaining to conduct being in good faith and the existence
of a long and established bargaining history).
109. Member Jenkins, in his dissent in Collyer Wire, states that in Schlitz only the question
of dismissal received a majority, and that actually a majority of the Board was against deferral.
Nonetheless, the case was cited in Collyer Wire by the majority as support for its deference
position.
110. See notes 101 & 102 supra.
II.
182 N.L.R.B. 904 (1970), enforced as modified, 443 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1971).
112. 182 N.L.R.B. at 904 n.3. Member Brown dissented, urging that deference was appropriate, on the basis of Schlitz, since there were other factors present in Progress Bulletin similar to
those in Schlitz. The majority, however, seemed to say: "No question of contract interpretation,
no deference!"
113. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
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age the practice of collective bargaining. The vigorous dissents argued
that the effect of the decision was to enforce compulsory arbitration"'
and that the decision constituted a complete reversal of Board precedent. 5 Although the majority opinion in Collyer may not have the far
reaching effect asserted by the minority, the decision should have a
significant impact on satisfying the necessity for more refined guidelines
regarding the Board's deference rationale.
III.

THE AFTERMATH OF COLLYER WIRE

As a result of Collyer Wire, the Board's deference rationale begins
with the question whether the dispute centers around the terms and
meaning of certain contract provisions. The competence of the arbitrator is confined to his function of interpreting and applying collective
bargaining agreements. Consequently, if the dispute does not involve
contract interpretation or application, the dispute is not within the competence or the function of the arbitrator; therefore the Board will not
defer, even if other favorable circumstances exist." 6
If, on the other hand, the dispute does involve contract interpretation or application, Collyer Wire suggests that the Board may defer
when the surrounding circumstances are favorable. The decision to defer
in Collyer Wire substantially depended on the fact that the terms and
meaning of the contract lay at the center of the dispute. Thus, the
contract issue will be a significant primary consideration in future Board
cases, with deferral less likely as the issue becomes more peripheral. In
addition, Collyer Wire indicates that even though contract interpretation may be central to a dispute, the Board will continue to consider the
surrounding circumstances in reaching its decision. For example, the
Board will analyze the general relationship of the parties. A successful
and established bargaining history will be favorable; a poor bargaining
record, however, probably would cause deference to be refused. The
Board also will consider whether the employer's unilateral changes were
114. Member Fanning argued that (1) since the charging party had not filed any grievances
and the time to do so had passed, and (2) since all arbitration provisions give parties the right to
arbitrate, but not the duty to arbitrate, the effect of the Board's deferral is essentially compulsory
arbitration.
115. Member Jenkins cited numerous cases in which the Board had refused to defer "unilateral change of contract" disputes, despite the availability of arbitration. Although these cases, cited
throughout this note, do suggest that the Board usually has refused to defer in such cases, it is not
precisely correct to say that the Board had not deferred in such cases in the past. See Note, supra
note 42.
116. See Progress Bulletin Pub. Co., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 74 L.R.R.M. 1237 (1970),
enforced as modified, 443 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1971).
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made in good faith and not to undermine the union. This suggests that
deferral will be denied when the alleged wrongful conduct involves an
unlawful motive, such as in section 8(a)(3) discrimination cases.
The major impact of Collyer Wire, however, depends on whether
the Board will continue to consider the willingness of the parties to
arbitrate a determining factor. Answering the dissent's charge that the
effect of Collyer Wire meant compulsory arbitration, the majority
stated that its decision was not "compelling" the parties to arbitrate,
but merely holding them to their agreement to settle disputes by arbitration. They had agreed to arbitration, and the Board should not allow
them to "sidestep" the agreement by retaining jurisdiction. "7 Consequently, the language does suggest that the Board might defer to arbitration in the future even if neither party wishes to go to arbitration.
NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller, one of the Collyer Wire majority,
has stated that he favors the concept of voluntarism in dispute settlement." 8 The question arises of how voluntary the Collyer Wire order is
when it could be interpreted to compel parties to utilize their voluntary
methods when neither of them has voluntarily chosen to do so. " 9 Such
a concept of voluntarism might encourage parties to eliminate arbitration provisions from their collective bargaining agreements, because
they would be contracting away access to the Board and leaving themselves with the increasing costs of arbitration. 2 Thus, Collyer Wire
should not be implemented by the Board to the extent of ordering
essentially compulsory arbitration for both parties. The Board should
adhere to its more justifiable rule that it will21not send the parties to
arbitration when neither of them wants to go.
The more puzzling question of Collyer Wire is whether the Board
will continue to refuse deference when the employer is unwilling to
arbitrate. 22 Some language of the opinion suggests that the Board would
not continue to do so; the Board implies that the employer should be
bound to his agreement to arbitrate if the other party seeks to enforce
that agreement.'3 On the other hand, the majority's emphasis of the
117. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1937.
118. Address by NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller, Conference of Western States Employer Association Executives, Aug. 27, 1971, reportedin 78 LAB. REL. REP. 28 (1971).
119. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1949.
120. Costs were set at S539.88 per day in 1970, and in 1971, one large corporation estimated
arbitration costs at S,800 per day for thecompany and $1,900 perday for the union. Kilberg, The
FMCS and Arbitration:Problems and Prospects, 94 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 40, 41 (April 1971).
121. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
122. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
123. See 77 L.R.R.M. at 1937.
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fact that the employer was willing to arbitrate suggests that his willingness remains essential for deference. '2 This latter interpretation is the
one accepted by NLRB General Counsel Peter G. Nash.' When an
arbitration award has been rendered, however, if it is not necessary that
the employer, or even the other party to the dispute, be willing to
arbitrate for the Board to find deferral appropriate, then Collyer Wire
might conflict with the Board's Spielberg rationale which requires that
both parties must have agreed to be bound before the Board will defer.,
If the parties are held to have bound themselves when they agreed to
the contract, then Spielberg is satisfied. Collyer Wire would deviate
from the Spielberg test, however, if the parties' willingness to be bound
by the proceedings is determined independently from the fact that the
parties had previously signed an agreement. This would not constitute
a reversal of Board precedent, though, because the accepted test of
InternationalHarvester'2' would, in essence, still be satisfied.

The Collyer Wire minority has overstated the probable significance
of the case. Instead of effectuating compulsory arbitration or a reversal
of Board precedent, the decision will stand for the principle that when
the existing dispute arises out of the terms and meaning of the collective
bargaining contract, the Board will defer when the surrounding circumstances make arbitration appropriate. It is possible, however, that the
fears of the minority will be realized if the Board proceeds to order
arbitration when both parties, or merely the employer, do not wish to
arbitrate. Collyer Wire would then become known as a landmark decision in labor law constituting a major change in the Board's rationale
on deference.
The only other change of equal significance would be any adoption
of rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act that could establish guidelines for Board discretion.2 8 As early as Timken Roller
Bearing,2 1 the Board recognized that the defending party should not
suffer the costs of defending the same charge in one forum after winning
in the other. The Spielbergdoctrine and the entire deference policy exist
to alleviate dual litigation. Perhaps the complaining party should be
able to choose the forum in which to proceed with his case, but with the
requirement that the other forum will be closed to him forever. This,
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1936.
See note 95 supra.
See notes 78-84 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 80 & 81 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 31 & 32 supra and accompanying text.
See note 76 supra.
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no doubt, would relieve much of the deference problem. Until such rules
are adopted, however, the Board's rules of decision delimit the NLRB
deference policy, of which Collyer Wire is the latest word. It is a word
with Board rationale, but perhaps
that is, for the most part, consistent
13
result.
its
in
forward-reaching
ALAN COMSTOCK ROSSER

130. A recent case which relied heavily upon the Collyerdecision was Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. CWA, 80 L.R.R.M. 2513 (1972). Here, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas
held that an injunction would be issued against a union despite the union's claim that the strike
was called to protest the alleged unfair labor practice of the employer. In relying on Collyer, the
court stated that the NLRB was unlikely to take this case because the contract involved contained
an arbitration clause. If the court did not assume jurisdiction, the public would be faced with "a
strike which is arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board and beyond the remedial
reach of the courts." Id. at 2517. The court concluded by holding that the inclusion of no-strike
and arbitration clauses in a contract raises a presumption that unfair labor practice disputes are
arbitrable unless otherwise specified.

